Abstract-The radio channel response decorrelates rapidly as the transmitter changes location in an environment with rich scatterers and reflectors. Based on this fact, a channel-based authentication scheme was previously proposed to discriminate between transmitters at different locations, and thus to detect spoofing attacks in wireless networks. In this paper, we study its application in frequency-selective Rayleigh channels, considering channel time variations due to environmental changes and terminal mobility, as well as the channel estimation errors due to the interference from other radios. We propose a generalized likelihood ratio test (GLRT) that is optimal but computationally cumbersome, and a simplified version that requires no a priori knowledge of channel parameters and is therefore more practical. We verify the efficacy of the channel-based spoofing detectors via numerical analysis, showing how performance is improved by using multiple antennas, higher transmit power, and wider system bandwidth. We show that, under a wide variety of practical conditions, spoofing can be detected with better than 90% probability while keeping the probability of falsely rejecting valid transmissions below 10%.
channel response is hard to predict and to spoof. We can exploit this property to discriminate between transmitters located in different places. This is the basis of our channel-based spoofing detection, wherein the receiver tracks the channel response for each message and detects spoofing attacks by comparing the channel responses for messages claiming the same user identity. The scheme utilizes the channel estimation mechanism existing in most wireless systems, and therefore introduces no additional system overhead.
To assess the performance of this scheme in practical systems, we address two significant impairments. First, the channel response can vary over time due to terminal mobility and/or environmental changes, e.g., a group of people moving about. Second, the accuracy of channel estimation can be corrupted by factors such as phase drift of the receiver local oscillator, receiver thermal noise, and interference received from other users in the same band.
Our previous work [10] - [13] has partly addressed these impairments and validated the efficacy of the channel-based authentication for various cases, notably, environmental changes [11] , and terminal mobility [13] . However, these studies are limited by virtue of using different heuristic test statistics for each scenario. Moreover, previous performance evaluations were based on a specific channel emulation software [16] , with results depending closely on a specific network topology and building environment. Here, we present a more unified approach based on a more general characterization of the channel. Specifically, we investigate channel-based spoofing detection using a well-established stochastic channel model, in a generalized scenario that includes Doppler, multiple antennas, and channel estimation errors. We propose a generalized likelihood ratio test (GLRT) that is optimal but complicated, and a simplified version that requires no a priori knowledge of channel parameters and is therefore more practical. We present and compare their performances via numerical analysis, and we also derive a best-case performance bound for the simpler test. The results presented in this paper will help facilitate the eventual integration of PHY-based security into practical wireless systems.
We begin by briefly reviewing related work in Section II. We describe the problem model in Section III, and we present the underlying stochastic channel model in Section IV. We propose two ways to implement the authentication using hypothesis testing in Section V, and also define our performance metrics. In Section VI, we derive an analytical expression for best-case performance, and then present numerical results for all cases in Section VII. We conclude the paper in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
Several physical-layer authentication techniques have been proposed to enhance security in wireless networks, exploiting the physical-layer information such as the received signal strength (RSS) [4] , [7] , [8] , channel impulse response (CIR) [9] , and channel frequency response (CFR) [10] - [13] .
Note that CIR and CFR are the time-and frequency-domain expressions of channel response, containing more locationspecific information than RSS. Hence the CIR/CFR-based techniques, [9] - [13] , can provide higher accuracy than those using RSS, [4] , [7] , [8] .
As a benchmark, we first investigated the channel-based spoofing detection for time-invariant path gains, [10] . Then the impact of channel time variations and terminal mobility were studied in [11] and [13] , respectively. We also explored the use of multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO)-techniques with the channel-based detector in [12] .
III. PROBLEM MODEL
As shown in Fig. 1 , our analysis is based on an Alice-BobEve model, where Alice and Bob are the legal transmitter and intended receiver, respectively. The spoofing adversary, Eve, injects messages using Alice's identity, e.g., her MAC address, in the hope of spoofing her. The distance from Bob to Alice (Eve) is denoted as ( ). Suppose Bob receives two messages at times indexed by and + 1, with the time interval between messages being . Both messages are labelled with the sender identity of Alice. We assume that Bob knows that Alice indeed sent the first message at ; this can be confirmed using a standard higher-layer protocol (cf., [17] ) in parallel, we discuss later. The second message, sent at + 1, is either a legal message from Alice or a spoofing one sent by Eve. Bob seeks to use the channel-based spoofing detector to determine whether the second message belongs to Alice.
Without loss of generality, we consider an × multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) system [18] : both Alice and Eve use ≥ 1 transmit antennas, while Bob uses ≥ 1 receive antennas. The antennas are spaced so that the channel paths of different antenna pairs fade independently. We assume that Alice might move and/or that the propagation environment may change, e.g., due to people moving. Finally, we allow the possibility that channel gain estimation may be corrupted by additive interference, as well as additive noise.
IV. SYSTEM AND CHANNEL MODELS

A. Channel Samples
The receiver for Bob estimates the channel response based on pilot or preamble symbols in the message, and obtains a channel vector containing ′ independent channel samples (in frequency). This can be conveniently implemented in orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) systems, where channel responses are measured at ′ tones based on pilots equally spaced within the system bandwidth of . If the minimum frequency separation, / ′ , is greater than the channel coherence bandwidth, the ′ channel samples are essentially uncorrelated. We assume that is the case here, although the discussion can be easily extended to the case where the channel gains for neighboring pilot tones are correlated.
The use of multiple antenna techniques expands the dimension of the channel vector from ′ to = ′ , and thus improve the channel resolution. Our spoofing detection scheme can benefit from this increase, especially when the overall system bandwidth is too small to afford a large number of independently faded tones.
B. Channel Estimates
To model the channel estimation at time instant , we assume an unknown phase measurement error, denoted as ( ) ∈ [0, 2 ), due to the drift of the receiver local oscillator. We also assume the receiver thermal noise contributes an additive complex Gaussian error component, ( ), to each channel gain estimate. This error is zero-mean and independent across frequencies and receive antennas, with a common variance 2 . Another impairment, often omitted in channel estimation models [10] - [13] , is interference from other radio users. We can model the interference effect on channel estimation as contributing a random error component, ( ), to the true value of each measured channel gain. As in the noise case, we model these errors as zero-mean, complex Gaussian and independent across frequencies and receive antennas, with a common variance 2 . The channel estimation vector at time ,ˆ( ), can thus be given byˆ(
where ( ) is the "ideal" channel vector without estimation error; and ( ), ( ), and ( ), are independent from each other, as well as from their counterparts at time + 1. Since ( ) is estimated by dividing the complex sample of the received pilot tone by √ , where is the transmitted power per tone, we can write the following for the variances of and :
and
where and are the average receiver noise and interference powers, respectively, for each measured tone. Thus we can write
where I is the × identity matrix.
C. Channel Gains
As noted, we assume the first message at time is not a spoofing one, i.e., ( ) ≡ ( ), where the subscript 'A' denotes that the transmitter is Alice. The sender of the second message is either Alice or Eve, and thus we have ( + 1) = ( + 1) or ( + 1), where the subscript 'E' represents Eve.
In our analysis, the three locations (for Bob, Eve, and Alice) are specified, and we assume that ( ) and ( ) are independent, frequency-selective Rayleigh channels, i.e.,
where 2 and 2 are the locally averaged power gains along the paths from Alice to Bob and from Eve to Bob, respectively.
Propagation theory shows that, in an environment full of scatterers and reflectors, the channel response decorrelates rapidly as the terminal location changes by the order of a wavelength, which is 6 cm for systems working at 5 GHz [15] . Note that both Alice and Eve can be anywhere in the coverage region of Bob and that in practice, Eve cannot be close to Alice (in units of wavelength). For typical terminal speeds (∼ 1 m/s) and practical time intervals between measurements (∼ 3 ms), we can assume that Eve at time + 1 cannot be close to Alice's previous location. We therefore assume that ( ) and ( + 1) are independent. By (1)- (4), we havê
Similarly,ˆ(
D. Channel Variations
Assuming a short enough interval between successive transmission , Alice at time + 1 will be close to her previous location, i.e., on the order of a fraction of a wavelength, and thus ( ) and ( + 1) are correlated. As an extreme case, we have ( + 1) = ( ), e.g., for static channels. In general, however, due to environmental changes and/or terminal mobility, the channel vector can vary with time. For the case of mobility alone, this can be modeled by
where is the correlation coefficient between channel gain samples spaced by ; and 1 ( ) is an -dimensional vector in which each term is an i.i.d. zero-mean complex Gaussian process that is independent of ( ), with each element having a variance
Assuming that Alice moves with a speed of , and using the Jakes model [15] , we can write
where the superscript denotes conjugate transpose, is the RF wavelength, and 0 (⋅) is the Bessel function of the first kind and zero-th order. The 0 (⋅) term is seen to be nothing other than the correlation coefficient in the above discussion. If Alice moves so slowly that ∼ 0 (more specifically, / ∼ 0), then it is clear that ∼ 1. Finally, we consider the possibility that, even if Alice is stationary, there can be time variations of the path gains due to movement of objects and/or people in the environment. We envision this as a zero-mean gain variation added to an average gain. It is accounted for in (8) by adding a vector 2 ( ), which represents the change in the environment-caused variation from time to time + 1. As we will explain in Section IV-E, we model each element of 2 as zero-mean, complex Gaussian and independent across paths and frequencies, with a common variance 2 2 . With this term included, the additive time variation in (8) can be treated as the sum of two random, independent complex Gaussian processes, 1 and 2 , due to terminal motion and environment changes [11] , respectively, i.e.,
By (1)- (5), (8), and (11), we can writeˆ( + 1), conditioned on the measuredˆ( ), aŝ
where 0 = ( + 1) − ( ), and
E. Comments on the Modeling of 2 and
In the most general formulation of the problem, the temporal process 2 ( ) can be correlated from path to path and/or from frequency to frequency. This process is defined as the change, from time to time + 1, in the gain variation caused by moving scatterers in the environment. We hypothesized a model in [11] for the environment-caused time variation in a single path gain (the MIMO case was not considered). Specifically, we treated it as a wide-sense stationary uncorrelated scattering (WSSUS) process, with a decaying exponential for the power delay profile and a firstorder autoregressive (AR-1) process for the time variation. A limited set of indoor measurements with people moving about was subsequently reported in [19] , [20] , and it provided support for our hypothesized model. Nevertheless, this topic lacks sufficient empirical data to propose specific correlations in space and frequency. Therefore, to simplify this study that is already rich in parameters, we assume the process 2 ( ) to be "white" in both domains. We will also assume mean-square values for it that are quite a bit larger than those we would expect, based on [19] , [20] , so that we can demonstrate the relatively low impact of this phenomenon.
Similarly, the additive interference, ( ), could in reality be correlated across receive antennas (space) and/or frequency. Nevertheless, we treat this process as "white" as well because, of all the many possible assumptions, this is the simplest. As a result of both "whiteness" assumptions, the environmentcaused gain variations and the additive interference can both be treated by simply lumping variances, i.e., This permits us to quantify the impact of 2 ( ) and ( ) without needlessly complicating our analysis, while leaving room in the formulation for more correlated versions of these processes.
V. CHANNEL-BASED AUTHENTICATION TEST
Channel-based spoofing detection is based on a hypothesis test. The goal is to determine whether the second message at + 1 also belongs to Alice, using two channel vectors,ˆ( ) andˆ( + 1). We build the following hypothesis
Under the null hypothesis, ℋ 0 , the message at + 1 does belong to Alice, i.e., no spoofing attack. Otherwise, under the alternative hypothesis, ℋ 1 , there is a spoofing attack, i.e., the message belongs to Eve.
A. Generalized Likelihood Ratio Test (GLRT)
A generalized likelihood ratio test for the hypothesis (14) and (15) in the generalized system model is given by
where || || denotes the Frobenius norm of the matrix A, 2 is given by (13) , and = (ˆ( + 1)ˆ( ) ). Proof: Since the phase rotation, , is usually unknown, the generalized likelihood ratio test [21] for the system model can be written as a function ofˆ( + 1), i.e.,
By (6), (12), (14) , and (15), we can rewrite (17) as
where
The phase term is introduced to adjust for possible phase drift in the receiver oscillators from one measurement (at ) to another (at + 1). If this drift occurs and is not accounted for, Alice can be falsely rejected just because
is not zero and might exceed the test threshold. The price paid for making this adjustment, and thus avoiding false rejection of Alice, is that the measurement vector of an intruder (Eve) will also be phase-aligned with the prior measurement, and so the "miss detection probability" (the probability of not detecting spoofing) will also increase. We examine this issue in our numerical results, Section VII.
It is clear that the GLRT requires a priori knowledge of the channel parameters such as , , , , and 2 . These parameters can in principle be obtained via training at a considerable cost in complexity.
B. A Simpler Test with Unknown Channel Parameters
In practice, wireless systems are not always able to obtain the channel parameters in (16) . However, if both the channel time variation and estimation error are so small that 2 ≪ 2 + 2 + 2 , then the GLRT (16) can be simplified into a more practical test,
where the test threshold usually differs from ′ in (16) . Under the assumption of the Jakes model (i.e., that the arriving multipath at the receiver is uniformly distributed in azimuth), we can identify as the term 0 (2 / ) in (10). Even if the terminal speed is unknown, the receiver (Bob) can implement the simple test by making the approximation ∼ 1; this is equivalent to assuming / to be very small, as it would be in practical scenarios.
The new test can be viewed as the difference between two channel estimates, utilizing the exponential term to counteract phase measurement rotation. In real system implementation, (20) can be further simplified into
indicating small computational overhead. This approach can be viewed as the integration of our previous work in [10] , [11] and [13] .
C. Test Performance
In order to evaluate the performance of spoofing detection, we define the false alarm rate (or Type I error), , i.e., the probability that the test declares Alice as the intruder Eve by mistake; and the miss detection rate (or Type II error), , i.e., the probability that the test misses the detection of Eve. These metrics are defined, respectively, by
where the probabilities are taken over all channel vectors and measurement errors. We will assume, in our later presentation of results, that a "good" spoofing detector is one for which the false alarm and miss detection probabilities, and , are both below 10%. Schemes like those proposed here would almost certainly be paired with standard higher-layer protocols [17] and would have the benefit of reducing higher-layer overhead plus reducing miss detection probability [22] . Typically, the threshold is chosen according to different criteria for performance. As an example, we just consider the Neyman-Pearson test, which minimizes the miss rate subject to a maximum tolerable constraint on the false alarm rate [21] . Before the test, Alice first sends a number of training messages, based on which Bob computes for several , via (22) . Since decreases monotonically with , Bob can conveniently find the test threshold that reaches the required . The performance of the scheme depends on several system parameters in addition to the correlation coefficient , as given by the 0 (⋅) term in (10) . One is the signal-to-(interferenceplus-noise) ratio (SINR) of the channel estimates for Alice, defined by
Note that increases with transmit power, since the estimation noise and interference variances vary inversely with . Another key parameter is the ratio of the locally averaged path gains for Alice and Eve,
In general, increases as Eve moves closer to Bob (assuming fixed positions for Alice and Bob). Finally, there is the relative change in the locally averaged path gain from Alice to Bob,
Our numerical results will highlight the influences of these three critical parameters, , and ; also, the degrees of freedom, , and the normalized terminal speed, = / .
VI. A PERFORMANCE BOUND FOR TEST
The analysis of the performance of the test can be greatly simplified if we assume zero phase drift between measurements and no phase adjustment. In this case, we can replace in (20) with
Note that in (20) is, by virtue of minimizing over the phase , larger than ′ in (27). When the transmission at time +1 is due to Alice and not phase-drifted, will therefore be higher, for a given , using ′ ; however, if the transmission is from an intruder (Eve), will be lower. Overall, the curve of vs.
will be lower (better) using ′ , assuming no phase drift and adjustment. We will refer to this case as providing a best-case performance bound and show results for it later.
When the null hypothesis ℋ 0 is true (both channel samples are from Alice), we can approximateˆ( + 1) −ˆ( ) as a vector with i.i.d. complex Gaussian elements. Each element has zero mean and a variance given by [ˆ,
Thus, ′ under ℋ 0 is chi-square distributed with order 2 [23] . Given a test threshold , the false alarm rate can be written as
where 2 2 (⋅) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the chi-square distribution of order 2 . It is clear that rises as Alice moves faster, and is independent of and . For a given , the test threshold can be easily derived using (29): = 0.5
where −1 (⋅) is the inverse function of (⋅). This formula provides a way to set the threshold for the test .
On the other hand, when ℋ 1 is true (ˆ( ) is from Eve), the channel vectors,ˆ( + 1) andˆ( ), are independent. By (6) and (7), we havê
Hence the test statistic ′ is also chi-square distributed with order 2 , and we can simplify the miss rate as
As we see from (29) and (32), the test performance does not depend on the value of 2 , as it is absorbed into the threshold, . What matters are the estimation SINR, ; the Alice-Eve path gain ratio, ; the relative change in Alice's path gain due to environmental changes, ; and the correlation coefficient, , which is determined by Alice's speed, , through the dimensionless parameter = / .
VII. SIMULATION & NUMERICAL RESULTS
We performed Monte Carlo simulations to provide numerical results for the GLRT ( ) and the more practical test ( ), in a wide range of scenarios. We also provide some results for ′ . In all cases, the results are given as curves of vs. . The value of the test threshold, (or ′ ), determines the working point on the -curve. In our computations, we make the simplifying assumption (with no loss in generality) that 2 = 1.
A. Simulation Method
For each scenario, we first used (6) and (7) to generate two channel vectors,ˆ( + 1) andˆ( ). Then we obtained ( + 1) via (12) andˆ( ). Based on these -element vectors, we calculated the test statistics of via (16) and via (20) , for both ℋ 0 and ℋ 1 . We repeated the experiment = 20, 000 times. Given test threshold, , we computed the false alarm rate and miss rate by
where the indicator function ( ) = 1 if the statement is true, and zero otherwise. In this way, we obtained thecurve by simply varying (or ′ ).
B. Path Loss Model
Note that the mean-square values ofˆ( +1) andˆ( ), (6) and (7), are denoted by 2 and 2 . We can model them as the ratio version of the generic dB formula for path loss, [24] , i.e.,
where the path loss exponent ranges between 2 and 5 in most wireless environments; Ω denotes a reference path gain value, (e.g., the path gain at = 1 m); and the shadowing is usually modeled as a log-normal random variable. Thus, we can write in terms of its dB value,
where (or ) is the dB value of (or ). For any environment, such as an irregular-shape office building, the probability density function (PDF) of the logdistance ratio can be easily obtained via simulation, where Alice and Eve are assumed to be located with uniform (and independent) randomness anywhere in the coverage area. This PDF can be convolved with the Gaussian PDF of ( − ) to obtain the PDF of . At the end of the next sub-section, we will give a specific example wherein (1) shadow fading is assumed to be absent, − = 0; and (2) Alice and Eve are distributed at random in a circular area centered on Bob. As proven in the Appendix, the PDF of in this special case is a double-sided exponential given by (b) Fig. 2 . Miss detection rate ( ) vs. false alarm rate ( ) for two channel-based spoofing detectors: The GLRT, , and a simplified version, , as a function of (= 2 / 2 ). In this example, = 4 independent channel samples in each message; the SINR of the channel estimation is = 20 dB; the terminal is fixed ( = 0), and the channel's relative time variation power is = 0.2.
C. Numerical Results
We first present, in Fig. 2 , curves of vs. for the test statistics and . The worst case for is when the dB value of is 0 dB; in this case, Bob does not have the benefit of different power levels between Alice and Eve, which would aid in detecting spoofing. We see for that case, with = 4 independent channel samples, a channel estimation SINR of 20 dB, and a relative time variation power = 0.2, that a test using can still achieve a good result, e.g., = = 4%. Also, as in dB grows very large (either positive or negative), the test moves in the direction of near-perfect performance (i.e., towards = = 0).
For the simpler test statistic , negative dB values of yield worse results than positive ones, indicating that a "smart" intruder Eve would seek a position where 10 log 10 ( ) < 0 dB. The worst-case dB value for under this test is seen to be about −10 dB. At this value, the test can still achieve the reasonably good performance result ≈ ≈ 10%. and to highlight the influences of SINR ( ), degrees of freedom ( ), and relative time variation power ( ), all for the case when Alice is fixed ( = 0) and Alice and Eve deliver to Bob the same average power 10 log 10 ( ) = 0 dB. These curves quantify the superiority of the test . They also show how the performances of both tests improve with higher , lower , and higher ; and how the benefit of using diminishes for lower , lower and higher . Figure 3 (a) assumes a substantial channel time variation, = 0.2, and = 4 independent channel samples. The latter may be interpreted as using ′ = 4 independent tones in a single-antenna (SISO) system; ′ = 2 tones in a 2 × 1 MISO system; ′ = 2 tones in a 1 × 2 SIMO system; or 1 tone in a 2 × 2 MIMO system. For = 5%, we obtain ≈ 2% for and ≈ 4% for . Moreover, the performance gain is not significant as increases from 20 dB.
In Fig. 3 (b) , we consider the case of a moderate SINR, = 10 dB, with = 0.2. The use of a larger is a more efficient way to improve performance than to increase , especially if is already not very low. If is large enough (e.g., ≥ 12), both tests perform extremely well, e.g., achieving = 1% and < 0.3%. Figure 3 (c) shows how the performance degrades as the channel time variation rises. It is seen that is more robust against channel time variation than , and that these two tests achieve = ≈ 2.5%, and = ≈ 7.5%, respectively, when = 0.5, = 8, and = 20 dB. Figure 4 compares vs. for the three test statistics , and ′ , the latter being for the ideal case where no phase adjustment is needed or made. Results for each tests are shown for three values of = / . Assuming an RF frequency of 5 GHz ( = 6 cm) and a frame rate of 300 per second ( = 3.33 ms), the top, middle and lower sets of curves correspond, respectively, to = 2.7, 2.1 and 1.5 meters per second; or, in terms of human walking speeds, fast, brisk and moderate. Note that the simple test with no phase adjustment needed or made outperforms the ideal test with phase adjustment. Also, for even the most extreme terminal speeds, performance results on the order of = = 10% can be achieved or exceeded. Finally, a comparison between Figs. 4a and 4b shows the impact of the environment-caused gain variations, though it is not as strong here as for the case of no mobility ( = 0); its relative impact is diminished by the presence of the variance component
Finally, let us consider the reality that is a random quantity over all possible joint locations of Alice and Eve. To get an idea of the "average" performance over the range of , we invoke the conditions cited earlier, i.e., there is no shadowing, − = 0; and the coverage area is a circular region centered on Bob. Assume further that can be maintained fixed at 20 dB, say, by using power control; and that Eve, receiving the same power control commands as Alice, continues to transmit the same power level as Alice. In this case and the test statistic ′ , (27), we can get a nearanalytical solution for the average as a function of , using (37) for the PDF of and combining it with (32) for . 
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a generalized channel-based spoofing detection for wireless networks, utilizing a channel estimation mechanism to detect spoofing messages with low overhead. For this framework, we presented an optimized generalized likelihood ratio test, , and a practical test, , which does not require knowledge of the channel parameters. The efficacy of the scheme was verified via numerical analysis using a generic frequency-selective Rayleigh channel model.
Considering relevant issues such as terminal mobility, interference, channel time variation, channel estimation errors, etc, we found that the simple test is almost as good as the more optimal in many cases. We found that, for either test over a wide range of practical conditions (system and channel parameters), the false alarm rate and miss detection rate can both be held to levels of 10% or lower.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF EQUATION (37)
Assume that Alice and Eve are randomly uniformly distributed in a circular area centered on Bob with radius . Denote 1 = 2 and 2 = 2 , and assume that both 1 and 2 are independent and uniformly distributed between 0 and 2 , i.e., ∼ (0, 2 ), = 1, 2. For − = 0 and using (36), we easily get = 5 log( 2 / 1 ). Since Alice and Eve can exchange their locations, it is clear that the PDF of , ( ), is symmetric about = 0. For < 0, the CDF can be written as 
Given the symmetry about = 0, we have the result that the PDF of is ( ) = ( ) = ln(10) 10 10
